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LANDOWNERS' LIABILITY TO
INJURED FIREFIGHTERS IN ILLINOIS-
WASHINGTON V. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO.
When a firefighter is properly performing his job and is injured
due to the property owner's negligence, a question concerning the
landowner's liability arises. Seventeen years ago the Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed a jury's finding of liability on the part of the land-
owner in Dini v. Naiditch. 1 The court held that "an action should lie
against a landowner for failure to exercise reasonable care in the
maintenance of his property resulting in the injury or death of a fire-
man rightfully on the premises, fighting the fire at a place where he
might reasonably be expected to be." 2  The decision is recognized
for its elevation of the firefighter's status from licensee 3 to invitee 4 in
Illinois. Yet of equal importance is the court's finding that the duty of
care to maintain the premises includes compliance with certain fire
safety ordinances. 5
1. 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960). Plaintiffs were city firemen who were injured
while fighting a fire at defendants' hotel. A defectively attached stairway collapsed and plaintiffs
were buried in burning debris. Evidence of violation of fire safety ordinances was presented and
a jury verdict returned in favor of plaintiffs. The verdict was set aside by the trial judge. On
direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the verdict for plaintiffs, finding both com-
mon law negligence and violation of the ordinances as alternative bases of liability. In reaching
its decision, the court stated:
[FIrom the evidence previously noted that defendants failed to provide fire doors or
fire extinguishers, permitted the accumulation of trash and litter in the corridors,
and had benzene stored in close proximity to the inadequately constructed wooden
stairway where the fire was located, the jury could have found that defendants
failed to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and that the hazard of
fire, and loss of life fighting it, was reasonably foreseeable.
Id. at 417, 170 N.E.2d at 886.
2. Id. at 416-17, 170 N.E.2d at 886.
3. A licensee is usually described as one who comes upon the land with the landowner's
consent, but for his own purposes. The landowner owes the licensee a duty to refrain from
willfully or intentionally injuring him. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 376 (4th ed.
1971).
4. An invitee has been described as one who is invited upon the land for the landowner's
purposes and to whom the landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to make the premises safe.
See, e.g., W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 385-86 (4th ed. 1971). Before Dini, the issue of
landowner's liability to firefighters for negligently maintaining the premises had not been consid-
ered since 1892 in Gibson v. Leonard, 143 11. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892). Gibson stood for the
rule that a fireman had only licensee status in Illinois and the landowner had only to refrain
from willfully or intentionally harming him once he was on the property fighting the fire. The
Illinois Supreme Court in Dini overruled Gibson and the appellate cases which applied the
outdated licensee concept. For a detailed discussion of the development of the law in regard to
firemen's status, see Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 413-21, 170 N.E.2d 881, 884-88 (1960).
5. Liability additionally was based on defendant's violations of fire safety ordinances. The
code provisions were general in nature and were "intended to prevent a disastrous fire or loss of
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Dini was the law of liability in fireman injury cases until late in
1976 when the Illinois Supreme Court handed down its opinion in
Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co.6 (Arco). In that opinion, the
court held that a firefighter does not have a cause of action against a
property owner when he is injured fighting a fire which the land-
owner negligently caused, even where the landowner has violated fire
safety laws. This holding has significantly diluted the Dini ruling,
which was valued for its breadth and progressiveness. 7  Application
of the holding yields a result which is similar to the result which
occurs in much more restrictive jurisdictions. 8  This appears to be a
far cry from the intention of the Illinois Supreme Court in 1960 when
it rendered the Dini decision.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the reasoning employed by
the court in reaching its decision in Arco. It will also discuss the
effect of the decision on Illinois negligence law and will suggest how
and why the court should have reached a different result. Finally, it
will recommend alternatives which hopefully will be taken into con-
sideration by the Illinois courts and legislature.
ARCO'S FACTS AND REASONING
Two Chicago firemen were injured while fighting a fire at defen-
dant ARCO's gas station. The evidence indicated that a defective
shut-off valve on a gasoline pump had failed to operate, causing
gasoline to overflow and collect under and around a customer's car.
"No Smoking" signs were not posted. In the presence of a station at-
tendant, the customer lit a cigar and discarded the lighted match into
the spilled gasoline, thus causing the fire. The plaintiffs were sum-
moned to the scene in their official capacity and were burned by
life in case of fire." 20 I11.2d at 418, 170 N.E.2d at 887, quoting MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO
ch. 90, § 3 (1971). The firemen came within the scope of protection intended by the ordinance
and the violation was the proximate cause of injury. Thus the jury could properly find for the
plaintiffs on this basis.
6. 66 Ill.2d 103, 361 N.E.2d 282 (1976), reh. denied (1977) [hereinafter cited as Arco].
7. See note 30 infra.
8. For example, in an Indiana case, Pallikan v. Marks, - Ind. App. - , 322 N.E.2d
398 (1st Dist. 1975), a fireman was denied recovery in a suit for injuries incurred while fighting
a fire on defendant landowner's premises. Denial was based upon the licensee status attributed
to firemen in Indiana and the plaintiff's failure to state a breach of the duty which a landowner
owes to a licensee. Id. at 399.
Although a firefighter has invitee status in Illinois, see notes 3-4 and accompanying text
supra, and Arco agrees on this point, 66 Ill.2d 103, 105-06, 361 N.E.2d 282, 283-84 (1976), the
effect of the Arco holding is to deny recovery to a firefighter, just as recovery is denied in
jurisdictions where a firefighter has only licensee status. It is this result which appears to be
inconsistent with the intention of the Dini court.
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flaming gasoline which was expelled from the tank of the customer's
auto by heat-induced pressure. 9
The firemen filed an action in the Illinois Circuit Court of Cook
County against the gas station owner and others. 10  As in Dini, the
plaintiffs alleged both common law negligence and violation of lllinois
statutes" and city ordinances' 2 as bases for liability. The complaint
stated that the defendants were negligent in using a defective pump,
failing to prevent the gas tank from overflowing, and permitting the
customer to smoke while the car was being filled. When presented
with the issue, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed an appellate
court decision' 3 and reinstated the circuit court's grant of summary
9. The facts of the case are set out at 66 Ill.2d at 104-05, 361 N.E.2d at 282-83.
10. The defendants in the suit were Atlantic Richfield Co., the owner of the gasoline sta-
tion, Porter Sledge, the lessee and operator of the station, Richard Yeater, the station atten-
dant, and Charles Walker, the customer.
11. The Illinois Fire Safety Law provides in part:
No person, being the owner, occupant or lessee of any building or other structure
• . . shall permit such building or structure by reason of. . . lack of proper repair,
or any other cause to become especially liable to fire, or to become liable to cause
injury or damage by collapsing or otherwise. And no person . . . shall keep . . . on
such premises, combustible or explosive material or inflammable conditions, which
endanger the safety of said buildings or premises . . .
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127 , § 9 (1975).
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to keep . . . or use any crude petroleum
* . . or other like volatile combustibles . . . in such a manner or under such cir-
cumstances as will jeopardize life or property.
Id. § 153.
12. The Fire Safety Regulations of the Municipal Code of Chicago provides in part:
[Olils, paints, varnishes and similar fluids having a flash point above one hundred
fifty degrees Fahrenheit . . . shall, if stored in any building used for other purposes,
in quantities exceeding ten barrels aggregate, be placed in approved metal tanks,
and shall be drawn only by use of approved pumps or other approved devices.
MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO ch. 90, § 30 (1971).
Flammable liquids shall be drawn from tanks by pumps or other systems, which
shall be equipped with controlling apparatus and pipe shall be so arranged as to
control the quantity of discharge and to prevent leakage.
Id. ch. 60, § 101.
Smoking or the carrying of a lighted cigar, pipe or cigarette is prohibited; (a) in
every hazardous use room, building or premises.
Id. ch. 90, § 62.
Standard 'No Smoking' signs shall be conspicuously posted in every room, building
or premises where smoking is prohibited.
Id. §63.
It shall be unlawful to continue the use of or occupy any building, structure or
place which does not comply with those provisions of this code which are intended
to prevent a disastrous fire or loss of life in case of fire.
Id. 93.
13. 36 I11. App.3d 344, 342 N.E.2d 271 (1976). The appellate court determined that since
there were factual issues upon which liability could have been imposed, the trial court had
erred in granting a summary judgment for defendants. Special attention was given to the finding
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judgment for the defendants.' 4 The supreme court denied plaintiffs
recovery despite an acknowledgement that firefighters were invitees
by virtue of the Dini decision. 15
Following a series of appellate court cases, 16 the Illinois Supreme
Court narrowly limited Dini to its facts and held that the Dini rule of
liability did not apply to cases in which the firefighter's injury was
due to the landowner's negligent creation of the fire. The court stated
that the landowner's negligence must be unrelated to the cause of the
fire in order for a fireman to recover damages. 17 According to this
interpretation, a firefighter has a cause of action only when the al-
leged negligence is in the maintenance of the premises, and "mainte-
nance" was found not to include compliance with fire safety laws.' 8
The court also relied upon its own opinion in Fancil v. Q.S.E.
Foods, Inc. 19 and upon fireman injury cases from other jurisdictions
in which landowners were not held liable for negligently creating a
fire. 20  In Fancil, a wrongful death action was brought against a
storeowner by the wife of a deceased policeman. The officer had been
fatally shot by a burglar while conducting a routine security check of
the storeowner's premises. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that the
defendant had a duty to protect the invitee policeman from foresee-
able criminal acts of third parties and that he had been negligent in
disconnecting the mercury lamp which had provided exterior illumi-
nation during the officer's prior security checks. Relying upon the
"inherent risk doctrine,"21 the court found that officer Fancil was
that the defendants had violated certain fire safety laws and that such violations were the proxi-
mate cause of the injuries to the plaintiffs. Id. at 349-50, 342 N.E.2d at 275-76.
14. Upon denial of rehearing in April, 1977, Justice Dooley entered a compelling dissent in
which Justice Clark concurred. 66 Ill.2d 103, 110, 361 N.E.2d 282, 285 (1976), reh. denied
(1977) (Dooley, J., dissenting).
15. 66 Ill.2d 103, 105-06, 361 N.E.2d 282, 283-84 (1976).
16. Erickson v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R., 21 111. App.3d 546, 315 N.E.2d 912 (1st
Dist. 1974); Horcher v. Guerin, 94 Ill. App.2d 244, 236 N.E.2d 576 (2d Dist. 1968); Netherton
v. Arends, 81 111. App.2d 391, 225 N.E.2d 143 (4th Dist. 1967).
17. 66 11.2d at 108, 361 N.E.2d at 285.
18. Id.
19. 60 Ill.2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975). For a criticism of the Fancil decision, see Note,
Landlord's Duty to the Police-Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 378 (1977).
20. Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1964) (fireman killed fighting a fire
which spread very rapidly due to owner's failure to comply with law requiring sprinklers and
fire walls); Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960) (fireman fell when he mistook
smoke for a step); Spencer v. B.P. John Furniture Corp., 255 Or. 359, 467 P.2d 429 (1970)
(fireman injured in explosion while fighting negligently caused factory fire); Chesapeake and
Ohio Ry. v. Crouch, 208 Va. 602, 159 S.E.2d 650 (1968) (fireman killed while fighting a forest
fire negligently caused by railroad); Hass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 48 Wis.2d 321, 179
N.W.2d 885 (1970) (fireman injured fighting a fire negligently caused by railroad).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965), which provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by
[Vol. 27:137
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owed no duty of reasonable care, 22 and that therefore the complaint
failed to state a cause of action.
Lastly, the Arco court used the doctrine of assumption of risk to
deny recovery to the firemen. The court stated that the function of
firefighters was to deal with fires and that they assumed the attendant
risks. Therefore, at common law, a landowner was under no obliga-
tion to protect firefighters from injuries resulting from performance of
this function. And, in answer to the plaintiffs' second claim, the court
noted that the common law was not changed by statutes or ordi-
nances designed only for fire prevention and control.2 3
ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS REASONING
Certain difficulties are encountered in attempting to understand
the court's reasoning in Arco. First, the court made an artificial dis-
tinction between negligence in the failure to maintain the property
and negligent creation of the fire. 24 Second, the court relied primar-
ily upon distinguishable appellate court decisions for an interpretation
of its own earlier decision. 25 Third, emphasis was placed upon deci-
sions from other jurisdictions which clearly have been distinguished
from Dini.2 6  Fourth, the court mistakenly claimed to follow its
reasoning in Fancil, a case which does not lend support to the defen-
dant in Arco.2 7  Finally, the court should not have applied the doc-
trine of assumption of risk as an absolute bar to recovery in this
case. 28
By creating an artificial distinction between fire-related negligence
(which was not found to be a breach of the duty to maintain the
premises in a safe condition) and non-fire-related negligence (which
was viewed as a breach of duty), the Arco court exhibited a mere
a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to
protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
The court reasoned that the officer was trained to expect such danger and to protect himself
against it. Therefore, under § 343(b), the landowner could not be held liable.
22. 60 Ill.2d at 560, 328 N.E.2d at 542.
23. 66 Ill.2d at 109, 361 N.E.2d at 285.
24. Id. at 106, 361 N.E.2d at 284.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 108-09, 361 N.E.2d at 285.
27. Id. at 108, 361 N.E.2d at 284.
28. The court briefly discusses its application of the doctrine, a treatment which is insuffi-
cient, considering the impact on the outcome of the case. 66 1ll.2d at 109, 361 N.E.2d at 285.
1977]
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superficial adherence to Dini. The Dini court clearly did not wish to
recognize a definition of "maintenance" which would prohibit recov-
ery where the landowner's negligence caused the fire. This is evident
from its direction that compliance with fire safety laws be treated no
differently than any other facet of the duty to maintain the prop-
erty. 29 Since the distinction does not appear in the Dini decision,
and since Dini has been recognized for its broad holding,30 one can
view the Arco distinction as a deliberate attempt by the Illinois Su-
preme Court to bar a firefighter's right to recovery in situations where
private plaintiffs and other public employees would not be burdened
with such a restriction. This distinction is neither sound nor just,
since firemen have invitee status in Illinois and therefore are owed
the same duty of care as any other injured invitee. 31
A further problem is presented by the supreme court's heavy re-
liance upon appellate court decisions in which recovery was denied to
firemen suffering fire-related injuries. Because of the factual
similarities between Arco and Dini, particularly as to the statutory
29. See 20 Ill.2d at 421, 170 N.E.2d at 888, where the court states that "the safety ordi-
nances herein deal only with the maintenance of the premises.'
30. See J. PACE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY (1976), in which the author, discussing
the general rule that negligent setting of a fire does not give rise to a cause of action on behalf
of an injured fireman, states that "the Supreme Court of Illinois appeared to cast some doubt on
this rule in Dini v. Naiditch." Id. at 102; Note, Landowner's Negligence Liability to Persons
Entering as a Matter of Right or Under a Privilege of Private Necessity, 19 VAND. L. REV. 407
(1966), recognizing that decisions were unanimous until Dini in 1960, with even the very liberal
jurisdictions denying liability for negligent maintenance of property which contributes to the
creation of a fire. In regard to Dini, the author states:
The decision has generally been interpreted to mean that a fireman may recover
from the occupier who negligently allows a fire to occur which in turn is the proxi-
mate cause of the fireman's injury. . . . [lit has not been followed in the few cases
which have subsequently arisen in other jurisdictions.
Id. at 419; Note, Torts-Firemen-Duty of Landowners to Exercise Reasonable Care in Main-
taining Premises so as to Minimize Hazards of Fire for Firemen, 49 ILL. B.J. 594, 595 (1961);
Note, Torts: Landowner's Common Law and Statutory Liability to Firemen for Negligent
Maintenance of Premises: Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960), 47 CORNELL
L.Q. 119 (1962). See also 86 A.L.R.2d 1205 (1962), where Dini is discussed separately from
Krauth and its offspring: Scott v. E.L. Yeager Constr. Co., 12 Cal. App.3d 1190, 91 Cal. Rptr.
232 (4th Dist. 1970); Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1964); Jackson v.
Velveray Corp., 82 N.J. Super. 469, 198 A.2d 115 (1964); Spencer v. B.P. John Furniture
Corp., 255 Or. 359, 467 P.2d 429 (1970); Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Crouch, 208 Va.
602, 159 S.E.2d 650 (1968); Hass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 48 Wis.2d 321, 179 N.W.2d 885
(1970).
31. When a non-firefighter is injured in a negligently caused fire and is given invitee status,
he is owed a duty of reasonable care by the landowner to keep the premises safe from fire. The
jury decides whether or not the landowner behaved unreasonably in the creation of the fire. A
firefighter has been given this same status in Illinois, but it is meaningless if his case is always
to be automatically kept from the jury when he is injured by the fire.
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violations, one would logically expect the supreme court to rely upon
its own precedential decision in Dini. However, the court chose to
rely upon three lower court cases which are clearly distinguishable
from Dini and Arco in their facts. In two of these cases, the land-
owner had not violated any fire safety laws, 32 as was the case in Arco,
and in the third, the statutory violation was not the proximate cause
of the fireman's injury. 33 Furthermore, each appellate decision
relied upon the preceding ones and upon court decisions of other
states. 34  Once the first court created the bar to recovery in cases of
negligently caused fire, 35 the succeeding courts perpetuated this un-
fortunate narrowing of the respected and well-reasoned supreme
court decision in Dini.3 6
32. Netherton v. Arends, 81 111. App.2d 391, 225 N.E.2d 143 (4th Dist. 1967). In Nether-
ton, plaintiff-fireman was injured when he inhaled smoke produced by a fire. Plaintiff alleged
that the fire resulted from several negligent acts or omissions by the defendant-landowner.
Finding that the smoke was no different than the smoke normally present during fires, the court
held that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendant. Id. at 396, 225 N.E.2d at
146. Netherton is significant because it was the first Illinois decision in which the distinction
between fire-related and non-fire-related negligence was drawn.
Erickson v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R., 21 111. App.3d 546, 315 N.E.2d 912 (1st Dist.
1974). In Erickson, plaintiff, a volunteer fireman, was injured when a tank car, owned by de-
fendant-railroad, caught fire and exploded. Plaintiff brought suit alleging that the defendant's
negligence caused the fire. However, the appellate court denied recovery, holding that the
plaintiff had failed to make out a cause of action against the railroad. Id. at 549, 315 N.E.2d at
915.
33. Horcher v. Guerin, 94 IlI. App.2d 244, 236 N.E.2d 576 (2d Dist. 1968). In Horcher,
plaintiff-fireman was injured when a piece of glass struck his eye after he had broken a locked
window to ventilate a burning building owned by defendants. Plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dants were negligent in maintaining the building and in failing to obey an ordinance which
prohibited obstruction to windows. The court held (1) that negligence in the maintenance of the
building which causes a fire is not actionable and (2) that the violation of the ordinance was not
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Id. at 249, 236 N.E.2d at 579-80.
34. The Netherton court stressed the defective stairway in Dini and analogized it to a defec-
tive wall in Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951),
and a hole in the ground in Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920).
81 111. App.2d at 394, 236 N.E.2d at 145. In reality, the Dini court was not mainly concerned
with the faulty stairway but with the violation of the fire safety laws which may well have been
the cause of the fire.
The Horcher court relied upon the dissent by Justice Klingbiel in Dini, 20 Ill.2d at 436-37,
170 N.E.2d at 895-96, and upon Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960), and
Jackson v. Velveray Corp., 82 N.J. Super. 469, 198 A.2d 115 (1964), which have been recog-
nized as representing a different philosophy than Dini. See notes 37-42 and accompanying text
infra.
The Erickson court, a division in the First District other than the one in which Arco was
decided, relied upon Krauth, Netherton and Horcher as well as Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc.,
380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky, 1964) and Spencer v. B.P. John Furniture Corp., 255 Or. 359, 467 P.2d
429 (1970), which have been distinguished from Dini.
35. Netherton v. Arends, 81 111. App.2d 391, 225 N.E.2d 143 (4th Dist. 1967).
36. Following Erickson, the narrowing of Dini continued in two more appellate level cases.
In Marquart v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R., 30 I11. App.3d 431, 333 N.E.2d 558 (3d Dist.
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Close scrutiny of the decisions from sister states cited by the Arco
court exposes a third weakness in the decision: the clearly inappro-
priate use of Krauth v. Geller,37 a New Jersey case decided the same
year as Dini. In Krauth, the plaintiff, a fireman, was injured while
extinguishing an overheated salamander (portable stove) which was
burning unattended in a house still under construction. When he
mistook layers of smoke for steps, the plaintiff fell from a balcony
with no railing. The plaintiff brought suit against the landowner, but
the New Jersey Supreme Court denied recovery. 38 The case, which
involved no statutory violation, has been recognized as representing
the New Jersey Supreme Court's more conservative position on land-
owner's liability to firefighters, in contrast to the holding of the Il-
linois Supreme Court in Dini.39
The Krauth case is clearly distinguishable from Dini. First, a fire-
man does not have invitee status in New Jersey as he does in Il-
linois.40  Second, although no statutory violation was alleged by the
plaintiff in Krauth, the New Jersey court hinted that there might be
liability for a statutory violation. 4' Finally, the Krauth court ruled
against the plaintiff fireman on two major grounds: (1) the assumption
of risk doctrine, which was not mentioned in Dini; and (2) the policy
that imposition of liability for injury to firefighters would be too great
a burden on landowners.42 If, in Arco, the Illinois Supreme Court
was actually reaffirming Dini, it should have relied directly on that
decision. By citing Krauth, the court circumvented Dini.
1975), the court reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment for the defendants
against the plaintiff-fireman. Great reliance was placed upon Horcher, Erickson and Fancil. No
violation of statute was involved and the court stressed that the rule in Bandosz v. Daigger, 255
Ill. App. 494 (1st Dist. 1930), that an injured fireman may recover where he is injured because
of the landowner's willful and wanton misconduct was still valid and unchanged by Erickson,
Horcher, or Fancil. The Marquart court could not find any willful or wanton misconduct on the
part of the landowner and, therefore, denied the plaintiff's recovery. 30 Ill. App.3d at 434, 333
N.E.2d at 560-61.
Also, in Young v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R., 46 I11. App.3d 167, 360 N.E.2d 978 (3rd
Dist. 1977), the most recent case on landowner liability to injured firemen, the plaintiff's suit
was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
37. 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960).
38. Id.
39. See note 30 supra.
40. 31 N.J. at 272-73, 157 A.2d at 130. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that a fire-
man was neither a licensee nor an invitee but rather sui generis or in a class by himself. Id.
41. Id. at 274, 157 A.2d at 131. The court suggests that authority exists to support a finding
of liability for negligence where a statute has been violated. However, it seemingly interprets
those decisions to allow recovery only where such violation involves an "undue risk of injury."
Id.
42. Id. at 273-74, 157 A.2d at 131 (1960).
[Vol. 27:137
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In addition, the court referred to decisions from states whose
courts have adopted the Krauth philosophy. 43  These courts im-
plicitly or explicitly acknowledged that the Dini rule was more pro-
gressive, 44 but nevertheless declined to follow it. The Arco court's re-
liance on Illinois appellate decisions based on the Krauth philosophy
is also questionable since those jurisdictions refused to follow the Dini
ruling. Under these circumstances, the Arco court's emphasis, direct
and indirect, on the out-of-state opinion in question is extremely dis-
concerting.
The court's reliance on Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc. 45 generates
further criticism, not only because Fancil's facts are distinguishable
from those in Arco, 46 but also because that decision follows the Il-
linois appellate decisions discussed above. No statutory duty existed
in Fancil. The plaintiff merely asserted that defendant had breached
an alleged duty of reasonable care to protect the deceased police of-
ficer by failing to light the area around his store as usual. Such a duty
certainly must be considered remote when compared to the duty al-
legedly owed to the firefighters in Arco. If the court had interpreted
Dini properly, the statutory violations in Arco would have provided
an independent basis of liability. The Fancil decision serves as a
warning to lower courts that they must determine if there are any
statutory violations before determining the duty owed. 47  The court
43. Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1964); Spencer v. B.P. John Furni-
ture Corp., 255 Or. 359, 467 P.2d 429 (1970); Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Crouch, 208 Va.
602, 159 S.E.2d 650 (1968); Hass v. Chicago & N.. Ry. Co., 48 Wis.2d 321, 179 N.W.2d 885,
(1970).
44. In Hass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 48 Wis.2d 321, 327, 179 N.W.2d 885, 888 (1970),
the Wisconsin Supreme Court was primarily concerned with the burden on the landowner, as
in Krauth. In Spencer v. B.P. John Furniture Corp., 255 Or. 359, 363, 467 P.2d 429, 431
(1970), Justice Holman, after a discussion of Krauth and the assumption of risk doctrine, clearly
distinguished Dini from Krauth, stating:
The most notable authority cited as holding contrary to the above rule of non-liabil-
ity is Dini v. Naiditch . . . [which] has been widely cited as holding that an owner
or possessor of property is liable to a fireman for injuries suffered while fighting a
negligently caused fire.
Id. He then decided to follow the more conservative New Jersey view, relying on assumption of
risk and public policy.
The courts in Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Crouch, 208 Va. 602, 607-09, 159 S.E.2d 650,
653-55 (1968) and Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Ky. 1964), proceeded in a
similar manner, recognizing the distinction between the Illinois and New Jersey rules. They too
preferred to follow the New Jersey rule. The Buren court expressly stated that it did not follow
Dini in allowing recovery where the cause of the fireman's injury was also the negligent cause of
the fire. 380 S.W.2d at 99.
45. 60 ll.2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975).
46. See text at notes 19-22.
47. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 25, Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 36 II1.
App.3d 344, 342 N.E.2d 271 (1st Dist. 1976).
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appeared to recognize that liability may be imposed where an un-
reasonable risk to the fireman is created by the landowner's statutory
violation. 48 Fancil does not preclude recovery in Arco, in which the
defendants blatantly violated the fire safety laws.
The final serious flaw in the Illinois Supreme Court's reasoning in
Arco concerns the use of the doctrine of assumption of risk.49 In
effect, the use of this doctrine automatically negated any duty which
the landowner may have owed to the firemen regarding the mainte-
nance of the premises in a safe condition. Yet the court's application
of the doctrine is neither logical50 nor appropriate, considering the
circumstances of the Arco case. It is not logical because the court
classified the firemen as invitees to whom a certain duty of reasonable
care was owed. In allowing assumption of risk to remove that duty,
the court, in effect, denied that classification to firemen.
Use of the doctrine of assumption of risk is inappropriate for two
reasons. First, there is a growing trend in the United States to
abolish the use of absolute bars to recovery. These were especially
harsh on those plaintiffs who had acted reasonably, as was the case in
Arco. 51 Influential commentators have encouraged the abolition of
48. See 60 Ill.2d at 554, 328 N.E.2d at 539-40, where the court points out at the outset of
its opinion that:
This action is brought on a theory of common law negligence. The complaint alleges
the violation of no duty established by statute or ordinance. Necessary to recovery
is the existence of a duty or an obligation requiring one to conform to a certain
standard of conduct for the protection of another against an unreasonable risk.
49. "In its simplest and primary sense, assumption of risk means that the plaintiff, in ad-
vance, has given his consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him,
and to take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or
to leave undone." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 440 (4th ed. 1971).
50. See J. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY 96-98 (1976). See also Green, As-
suned Risk as a Defense, 22 LA. L. REV. 77 (1961). Professor Green notes that:
[N]ow and then a court prefers to base its judgment on assumption of risk. This is
done on the basis that if the danger is open and obvious the defendant owed the
plaintiff no duty. This is incompatible with good theory if in fact there was a duty to
make the premises reasonably safe . . . and the . . . [landowner] failed to do so.
Id. at 85. In Edgar, Voluntary Assumption of Risk in Texas Revisted-A Plan for its Abolition,
26 Sw. L.J. 849 (1972), the author states that:
To say that plaintiff is willing to encounter a danger is entirely different from saying
that he consents to the injury resulting from it. It cannot be said, with intellectual
honesty, that defendant owed plaintiff 'no duty' or that plaintiff consented or as-
sented to the injury. The most that can be said is that plaintiff acted unreasonably.
He may be contributorily negligent, either in law or in fact.
Id. at 853.
51. Such absolute bars include contributory negligence and the rigid common law classifica-
tions of trespasser, licensee, and invitee. The defense of contributory negligence allows the
defendant to prevent the plaintiff from recovering any amount of damages if it can be proven
that the plaintiff was negligent in the least bit in contributing to his own injury. In order to
combat the harsh effects of such a defense, courts and legislatures are adopting comparative
negligence systems which allow some recovery in proportion to each party's degree of fault. At
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the assumption of risk doctrine as such a bar, 52 and several states
have abolished or limited the application of the doctrine in all neg-
ligence cases. 53 Illinois has followed this trend in the past by con-
fining the defense of assumption of risk to cases involving express
consent or contractual or employment relationships. 54  Regarding
this time, comparative negligence has been adopted by court decision or statute in Arkansas
(ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (Cum. Supp. 1975)); California (Nga Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. 9
13-21-111 (Cur. Supp. 1976)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Cum.
Supp. 1977)); Florida (Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. 9
105-603 (1968)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (Supp. 1975)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. tit.
14 § 156 (Cur. Supp. 1976-77)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West
Cum. Supp. 1976-77)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Com. Supp. 1977)); Mis-
sissippi (MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972)); Nebraska (NEis. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1964));
New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (West Cur. Supp. 1976-77)); Oklahoma
(OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 11-12 (West Cur. SUpp. 1976-77)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2101-02 (Purdon 1977); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1976));
South Dakota (S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967)); Tennessee (Southern Ry. v. Pugh,
97 Tenn. 624, 37 S.W. 555 (1896)); Texas (TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon
Cum. Supp. 1976-77)); Vermont (Vt. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 895.045 (West Cur. Supp. 1976-77)); Wyoming (WyO. STAT. § 1-7.2 (Cur. Supp.
1975)).
The rigid common law classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee also have created
harsh results for plaintiffs who have acted reasonably. For the judicial response, see note 64
infra.
52. See J. PACE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY 95-98 (1976); Edgar, Voluntary As-
sumption of Risk in Texas Revisited-A Plan for its Abolition, 26 Sw. L.J. 849, 875 (1972);
Green, Assumed Risk as a Defense, 22 LA. L. REV. 77 (1961); James, Assumption of Risk:
Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968). In another article, James, Assumption of
Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952), Professor James stated that "[e]xcept for express assumption of
risk, the term and the concept.should be abolished. It adds nothing to modern law except
confusion." 1d. at 169. See also Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negli-
gence, 22 LA. L. REV. 5 (1961), in which the author noted that:
Accurate analysis in the law of negligence would probably be advanced if the term
were eradicated .... Then the true issues involved would be more clearly pre-
sented and the determinations ... Could be more accurately and realistically
rendered.
Id. at 14.
Its disadvantages lie primarily in its obfuscatory nature. It may either prevent an
accurate analysis by the court of the real problems involved in reaching the deci-
sion, or permit the court to write an opinion which eludes or covers tp the real
basis of the decision.
Id. at 15.
53. The defense of assumption of risk in negligence actions has been abolished in Alaska
(Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61, 68 (1968)); California (Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d
804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975)); Kentucky (Parker v. Redden,
421 S.W.2d 586, 592 (1967)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Cue.
Stipp. 1976-77)); New Jersey (McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 274-76, 196
A.2d 238, 239-41 (1963)); New Mexico (Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 341, 491 P.2d 1147,
1152 (1971)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. el. 18, § 18.475 (1975)); and Texas (Farley v. M M Cattle
Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (1975)).
54. See Barrett v. Fritz, 42 l1.2d 529, 248 N.E.2d 111 (1969). In Barrett, the court held
that the giving of an assumItion of risk instruction to the jury in cases other than those involv-
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fireman injury cases, the Dini court did not mention the doctrine at
all, nor did the Fancil court hold that policemen and firemen assume
all risks of' injury in all circumstances. 55 Furthermore, in other deci-
sions involving the violation of a fire safety law, Illinois courts have
not permitted assumption of risk to remove the case from a jury. 56
Thus, reference to the growing trend and to prior Illinois cases
would seem to indicate that the use of assumption of risk is inappro-
priate in a case such as Arco.
A second reason for the inappropriateness of the use of the doctrine
of assumption of risk in Arco is public policy. Public policy is often
mentioned by the courts in fireman injury cases to justify denial of
recovery.57 The policy argument expressed by the Arco court was
that "[s]ince most fires occur because of negligence, to hold a land-
owner liable to a fireman would impose a heavy and unreasonable
burden upon the owner." 5 8  However, countervailing public policy
supports the position of the injured firemen. Firemen come within
the purview of the statutes and ordinances in question. 59 These laws
were enacted to protect lives and prevent fires-purposes which are
ing express consent or contractual or employment relationships constituted reversible error. Id.
at 536-37, 248 N.E.2d at 115. See also ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 13.01, 13.02,
21.03 (1961).
55. 60 1l1.2d at 557, 328 N.E.2d at 541. The court noted that, regarding whether a risk is
reasonable and therefore inherent in the occupation, "[i]f there are factual issues involved in
making the determinations . . . they may be resolved by the jury tinder appropriate instruction
by the court.'" Id.
56. See, e.g., Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 64 111.2d 380, 356 N.E. 2d 93 (1976), in which the
plaintiff, a bulk oil dealer, was injured by an explosion which resulted from a fill pipe located in
violation of law. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision to strike the de-
fendant service station owner's affirmative defense of contractual assumption of risk, finding the
case a proper one to be heard by a jury. Even in jurisdictions which are less progressive than
Illinois, juries have heard cases involving firemen who have been badly burned while fighting a
negligently caused fire, especially where fire safety laws have been violated. See, e.g., Walker
Hauling Co. v. Johnson, 110 Ga. App. 620, 139 S.E.2d 496 (1964); Clark v. Corboy, 75 Wis.2d
292, 249 N.W.2d 567 (1977).
57. See Scott v. E.L. Yeager Const. Co., 12 Cal. App.3d 1190, 1198, 91 Cal. Rptr. 232, 237
(4th Dist. 1970); Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Ky. 1964); Krauth v.
Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 274, 157 A.2d 129, 131 (1960); Scheurer v. Trustees of the Open Bible
Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 171, 192 N.E.2d 38, 42-43 (1963); Spencer v. B.P. John Furniture
Corp., 255 Or. 359, 363, 467 P.2d 429, 431 (1970); Chesapeake and Ohio By. Co. v. Crouch,
208 Va. 602, 609, 159 S.E.2d 650, 655 (1968); Hass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 48 Wis.2d
321, 327, 179 N.W.2d 885, 888 (1970).
58. 66 ll.2d at 108, 361 N.E.2d at 284 (1976).
59. See note 5 supra. The wording of the statute is significant in determining its applicabil-
ity. In Dini, the court pointed out that when the language of the statute expresses that it is
intended only for the protection of certain people, i.e. employees of certain businesses,
firefighters do not come within the purview of the statute. But, when the language is general
enough to include the public, firefighters are a part of the group intended to be protected. 20
1l1.2d at 419, 170 N.E.2d at 887.
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poorly served by court decisions permitting landowners to flout fire
safety laws. The lives of firemen are as much in need of protection as
the lives of non-firemen. In fact, there is great social utility in pro-
tecting those who come to the rescue of others in trouble. The legal
system should encourage people to pursue occupations which render
such aid. In permitting defendants to escape liability for violation of
fire laws the legal system does nothing to encourage such a pursuit.
Additionally, the public has a genuine interest in effective fire pre-
vention which should be encouraged. The Arco decision, however,
fails to encourage landowners to contribute to their own safety and
that of the public. The ruling permits them to "knowingly ignore
dangerous conditions on their premises" and "reflects an improper
attitude in regard to society's obligation toward ... [fire] control." 60
The court does not explain why the burden on the landowner would
be unreasonable. In the Arco case, it would not have been costly to
fix the pump, post signs, and prevent the spillage. Whatever the cost
of compliance, regardless of the landowner's financial status, the cost
of lives lost and property damaged due to landowner negligence
would be much greater.
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
The supreme court's decision reinstating the trial court's summary
judgment had the effect of denying plaintiffs the opportunity for a
complete adjudication of their claims and thus defeated what should
be a major object of our judicial system. This situation can be
avoided in the future if either the judiciary or the legislature adopts
the various available means of assuring full consideration of the cir-
cumstances of each case. This would include the removal of rigid
rules of law which serve only to bar deserving plaintiffs from being
properly heard. The primary factor in deciding whether liability at-
taches to a landowner who negligently creates a fire in which another
is killed or injured should be the landowner's behavior, not the plain-
tiff's common law status or his occupation. Some suggestions as to
how this might be accomplished include: (1) the abolition of the
common law classifications of invitee, licensee, and trespasser 6' as au-
tomatic determinants of the duty owed by the landowners to those
who are injured on their property; (2) the abolition of the assumption
60. Note, Landlord's Duty to the Police-Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 26 DEPAUL L. REV.
378, 389 (1977).
61. A trespasser is defined as "a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession
of another without a privilege to do so, created by the possessor's consent or otherwise." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 329 (1965).
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of risk doctrine as a defense in negligence cases; (3) the abolition of
the "firemen's rule" 62 which the Arco court appears to have adopted;
and (4) the enactment of legislation which specifically allows an in-
jured fireman a cause of action against a landowner who has violated
fire safety laws resulting in the creation of a fire.
In his dissent in Arco, Justice Dooley advocated the abolition of
the common law categories which have been used to determine what
duty is owed to a plaintiff by the landowner-defendant, 63 'a position
for which there is ample support. 64 Such a change in Illinois law
would result in the application of the same general standard of
reasonable care in landowner cases as is applied in all other negli-
gence cases, 65 allowing all of the circumstances of the occurrence to be
62. The rule is:
[Wihere the defendant's negligence, whether active or passive, creates an apparent
risk, which is of the type usually dealt with by firemen, and which is the cause of
the fireman's presence, and which is the direct cause of the fireman's injury, the
defendant is not liable to the fireman.
Scott v. E.L. Yeager Constr. Co., 12 Cal. App.3d 1190, 1199, 91 Cal. Rptr. 232, 238 (4th Dist.
1970).
63. 66 Ill.2d 118, 361 N.E.2d at 289 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
64. England abolished the distinction between licensee and invitee in the Occupiers' Liabil-
ity Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, 55, 20th Century Statutes 831. The states which have
followed this example include Massachusetts in Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 707, 297
N.E.2d 43, 51 (1973); Minnesota in Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 164, 199 N.W.2d 639,
642 (1972); Wisconsin in Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis.2d 836, 856-57, 236 N.W.2d 1, 11
(1975).
The United States Supreme Court expressed its view that the common law categories are not
compatible with modern society in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S.
625, 631 (1959) and applied a general standard of care. Jurisdictions having abolished all of the
common law categories, doing away with landowners' immunity from the duty to act reasonably
are the District of Columbia in Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 105 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); California in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 119, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104, 443
P.2d 561, 568 (1968); Colorado in Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 548, 489
P.2d 308, 314 (1971); Hawaii in Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 135,
452 P.2d 445, 446 (1969); New Hampshire in Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H.
1976); New York in Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 240, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568, 352 N.E.2d
868, 872 (1976); Rhode Island in Mariorenzi v. Di Ponte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 307, 333 A.2d 127,
133 (1975). Louisiana appears to have followed the same path in Cates v. Beauregard Electric
Cooperative, Inc., 328 So.2d 367, 371 (La. 1976). For a discussion of the single standard rule,
see Cooper v. Goodwin, 478 F.2d 653, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Turkington, Torts: Toward a
General Negligence Standard for the Owner/Occupier, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 29 (1972); Recent
Developments, Torts-Premises Liability-New York Joins Minority of States Abolishing Tres-
passer, Licensee, Invitee Distinctions, 45 FORD. L. REV. 682, 688 (1976); Comments, Torts-
Occupier of Land Held to Owe Duty of Ordinary Care to all Entrants-"Invitee," "Licensee,"
and "Trespasser" Distinctions Abolished, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 426 (1969).
65. In those states which have abolished the common law categories (see note 64 supra), the
test is usually stated as whether, in the maintenance of his property, the landowner has acted as
a reasonable person under the circumstances, in view of the probability of injury to others.
Legal status 'may have some bearing on the question of liability, but it is not determinative.
Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872 (1976).
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taken into consideration, 6 6 usually by a jury. 67 Considering the Il-
linois Supreme Court's remarks on common law status in Dini,68 it
seems likely that the court was inviting the legislature to make such a
change, or was seriously contemplating undertaking the task itself.
The time has come for Illinois to strip away the shield of immunity
held by the landowner as to the duty to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances. As one court aptly stated, "[t]he principle of
stare decisis is not meant to keep a stranglehold on developments
which are responsive to new values, experiences and cir-
cumstances." 6
9
Justice Dooley also opposed the application of the assumption of
risk defense in fireman injury cases. 70 The doctrine automatically
bars plaintiffs who have behaved reasonably from recovering from
defendants who have caused the injury through their unreasonable
conduct. This result is contrary to the concept of negligence liability,
which is based on fault, and has met with widespread disapproval. 71
Where the plaintiff is free from fault, he should be permitted to pre-
sent his case. 72
If assumption of risk is not abolished as a defense in negligence
cases, Illinois should at least take steps to eliminate what appears to
be a "firemen's rule" as created by the court in Arco. The rule, a
66. The factors which may be taken into consideration include: (1) foreseeability of harm; (2)
certainty of plaintiff's injury; (3) nexus between defendant's conduct and the injury; (4) moral
blame; (5) the policy of preventing future harm; (6) the burden on the defendant and the con-
sequences to the community of imposing liability; and (7) the availability, cost and prevalence of
insurance. Turkington, Torts: Toward a General Negligence Standard for the Owner/Occupier,
22 DEPAUL L. REV. 29, 31 (1972).
67. Of course, the initial question of whether plaintiff has established sufficient facts to infer
negligence remains one for the trial court. However, once this is established to the court's
satisfaction, the question whether the plaintiff's conduct amounts to negligence is "inherently a
question for the fact trier." Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 242-43, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568, 352
N.E.2d 868, 872-73 (1976).
68. 20 1ll.2d at 416, 170 N.E.2d at 885-86, where the court states:
[I]t is our opinion that since the common law rule ... is but an illogical anach-
ronism, originating in a vastly different social order, and pock-marked by judicial
refinements, it should not be perpetuated in the name of'stare decisis' . . . . 'Stare
decisis' ought not to be the excuse for decision where reason is lacking.
69. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc. 469 F.2d 97, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
70. 66 lll.2d at 110-11, 361 N.E.2d at 286 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
71. See notes 52-53 supra.
72. James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 195 (1968). Pro-
fessor James states that:
The increasing judicial rejection of the assumption of risk doctrine reflects a recog-
nition that this defense is inconsistent with newer policies which underlie the inm-
position of a duty to take care of others that extends beyond merely warning them.
Id. at 192.
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more specific version of the assumption of risk doctrine, has been
stated as follows:
[W]here the defendant's negligence, whether active or passive,
creates an apparent risk, which is of the type usually dealt with by
firemen, and which is the cause of the fireman's presence, and
which is the direct cause of the fireman's injury, the defendant is
not liable to the fireman. 73
The effect of such a rule is the wholesale barring of innocent plain-
tiffs' causes of action. This injustice should be eliminated, since it is
based upon the rationale that a fireman is a licensee and that he
impliedly assumes the risks of his occupation. 74  Either the courts or
the legislature should ensure that a fireman's cause of action is not
barred where fire safety laws are violated and the violation proxi-
mately causes the injury. Gasoline station operators, factory owners
and other such commercial property owners are often the worst of-
fenders, and their negligence creates a great risk of the loss of
numerous lives, including those of firefighters.
Finally, legislation could be drawn to assure plaintiff-firefighters a
cause of action where, as in Arco, the landowner violated fire safety
laws which resulted in fire. Such legislation should alleviate the Il-
linois Supreme Court's fear that general imposition of liability to
firemen might place too great a burden upon the average homeowner
to keep his home safe from fire hazards. The cause of action could be
restricted to violations committed by commercial property owners.
However, it is suggested that Dini be allowed its full effect, permit-
ting causes of action for negligence by all persons in the maintenance
of their property. This would not be strict liability, since it would
merely allow the jury to examine the facts and determine whether
the defendant has acted reasonably under the circumstances. 75  No
matter what the burden, the potential loss of lives ought to warrant
such an application of Dini.
Under the laws of at least three states, the plaintiff could have pre-
sented his case to a jury, who could have given proper consideration
73. Scott v. E.L. Yeager Constr. Co., 12 Cal. App.3d 1190, 1199, 91 Cal. Rptr. 232, 238
(4th Dist. 1970).
74. Bartholomew v. Klinger, 53 Cal. App.3d 975, 980, 126 Cal. Rptr. 191, 193 (2d Dist.
1975).
75. See, e.g., Cooper v. Goodwin, 478 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In Cooper, the court
noted that:
Rather than rely on rigid labels and rules of law to provide the illusion of certainty
and fairness, we choose the jury as the mature institution to take account of the
infinite variety of fact situations which affect the reasonableness of human conduct.
Id. at 656.
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to all of the circumstances. New York, for example, has abolished the
common law classifications 76 and applies a general standard of care in
landowner liability cases. Also, comparative negligence 77 has replaced
contributory negligence. 78 The General Municipal Laws of New
York also provide for a civil cause of action against a landowner whose
safety ordinance violation results in injury to a firefighter. 79  In
Texas, although the common law categories have been retained, the
voluntary assumption of risk defense is not available in negligence
actions,80 nor is there a "firemen's rule" to bar recovery.81 Rather,
the Texas courts "are even willing to indulge in strained reasoning to
permit such recoveries [to firemen]." 8 2  California, the first state to
eliminate the common law classifications,8 3 no longer recognizes the
assumption of risk doctrine in negligence cases and has adopted a
comparative negligence system. 8 4 In addition, according to a recent
California case, the "firemen's rule" has been dissolved.8 5 Hopefully,
Illinois will choose to adhere to some of these same policies in the
near future.
76. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 (1976).
77. Comparative negligence is a method which permits the plaintiff who is contributorily
negligent to recover damages, but apportions those damages according to the degree of negli-
gence of the two parties. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TossTs 433-39 (4th ed. 1971).
78. Contributory negligence is "conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 416-17 (4th ed. 1971).
When the plaintiff is found to be contributorily negligent, regardless of the degree of negli-
gence, he is barred from recovery.
79. See McGee v. Adams Paper & Twine Co., 271 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1966); Carroll v. Pellico
Bros. Inc., 255 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1964); McAvoy v. Di Leo, 242 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1963); Gannon v.
Royal Properties, 136 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1954).
80. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
2212 (a) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-77).
81. See Harris v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 538 F.2d 682, 686 (5th Cir. 1976);
McAfee v. Travis Gas Corp., 137 Tex. 314, 153 S.W.2d 442 (1941); Acme Products Co. v.
Wenzel, 448 S.W. 2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Houston Belt and Terminal Ry. v. O'Leary,
136 S.W. 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
82. Harris v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 538 F.2d 682, 686 (5th Cir. 1976).
83. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
84. See Bartholomew v. Klinger, 53 Cal. App.3d 975, 980-81, 126 Cal. Rptr. 191, 194 (2d
Dist. 1975), where the court explained:
Since the application of the comparative negligence rule (in Nga Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975)), the defense of
assumption of risk appears no longer available to absolve the possessor of land to-
tally of his duty with respect to persons engaged in these professions.
85. Bartholomew v. Klinger, 53 Cal. App.3d 975, 126 Cal. Rptr. 191 (2d Dist. 1975), which
involved a policeman injured on defendant's premises while performing his job. Defendant
claimed that California had a "Firemen's Rule." The Bartholomew court found that Rowland
and Yellow Cab had undercut the rationale behind the rule and that it may no longer exist in
California. Id. at 980-81, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
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CONCLUSION
In Illinois, firemen, like other invitees, are owed a duty of reason-
able care by landowners in the maintenance of their property. This
duty should include keeping the premises free from fire hazards in
compliance with the law. When the invitee, who is free from any
contributory negligence, is injured as a result of the landowner's neg-
ligence, he has a cause of action against the landowner. A fireman
should be no exception. Dini v. Naiditch is clear on this point. If the
court had actually followed Dini in deciding Arco, a contrary result
would have been reached. Unfortunately, the court used an artificial
and meaningless distinction to avoid following Dini, and one must
now wonder what, if anything, is left of that decision. Hopefully, the
future will bring enlightenment on this matter as well as more sensi-
ble judicial craftsmanship than is found in Arco.
Stacey Stutzman
